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SpotlightApparently, the act of free choice confers value: when
selecting between an item that you had previously cho-
sen and an identical item that you had been forced to
take, the former is often preferred. What could be the
neural underpinnings of this free-choice bias in decision
making? An elegant study recently published in Neuron
suggests that enhanced reward learning in the basal
ganglia may be the culprit.
Would you prefer the chicken or the pasta entre´e? And
what would you think of an airline that offers only one of
these entre´es? Obviously, all else being equal, you would
prefer the airline that gave you a choice. After all, that can
result in more enjoyment of your in-flight meal. But what if
the airline had studied your preferences and offered you
the single entre´e you would have chosen anyway, had you
flown with the competitor? Would you have a preference
between the two airlines? And in what situation would the
pasta be tastier (if this adjective is ever applicable to what
airlines call pasta)?
In an article recently published in Neuron, Cockburn
et al. (2014) [1] report the results of an experiment that
created just such a scenario: participants learned the value
of each of six different options through repeated choices
between pairs of options. Intermingled with these were
trials in which participants were shown a pair of options
drawn from a separate, visually distinct set of six stimuli,
with one of the options marked as the one that must be
chosen. Importantly, Cockburn and colleagues yoked the
trials such that each choice from the first set of options was
exactly replicated in the second set. Thus, by any simple
learning model, the learned values of each ‘free choice’
option and its corresponding ‘forced’ option would be iden-
tical. However, when given a choice between the two in a
subsequent test phase, participants showed a clear prefer-
ence for the option they had freely chosen. This pattern was
found for all three positive-value stimuli, but not for sti-
muli whose choice led to losses more often than to gains.
A preference for freely chosen options had been demon-
strated before [2–5], but not as elegantly. For instance, it is
not sufficient to show that when choosing between two
equally valued options, the chosen option is subsequently
evaluated as better than its competitor. It is conceivable
that choices spur us to resolve value more precisely; there-
fore, the subsequent preference for the previously selected
option is possibly not due to a free-choice bias, but rather
because this option was inherently more valuable, but its1364-6613/
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burn et al.’s experimental design successfully avoided this,
and several other, possible confounds.
Other than a perplexing case of cognitive dissonance [6],
what could be driving the preference for freely chosen
options? Cockburn et al. used a computational model of
reinforcement learning couched in basal ganglia anatomy
and physiology [7] to suggest that free choice enhances
learning from rewards. The idea is that when an option is
freely chosen, unexpected rewards cause stronger long-term
potentiation (LTP) of ‘go’ (direct) pathway striatal neurons
and more long-term depression (LTD) of ‘no-go’ (indirect)
pathway neurons, thus promoting stronger propensity to
choose the same option in the future, as compared to a
similarly unexpected reward obtained for a forced choice.
Cockburn et al. further suggested that the enhancement is
due to amplification of positive reward prediction error sig-
nals conveyed by dopamine neurons in the substantia nigra
pars compacta, which modulate corticostriatal learning in a
three-factor learning rule. However, the implementation of
this mechanism in the model – by multiplying by some factor
the size of the update in free-choice trials that led to a positive
prediction error – is also consistent with other alternatives.
Specifically, the three-factor learning might be enhanced due
to stronger presynaptic cortical activity (e.g., due to enhanced
attention, and thus representation, of the options in the free-
choice trials) or stronger post-synaptic striatal activity (e.g.,
due to random fluctuations of the value of different options [8]
– valuation noise is likely to be positive conditional on the
option being freely chosen, whereas in the identical forced
choice trial it is, on average, zero). The latter explanation
would predict a stronger free-choice bias when choosing
between options that initially had a low value, however,
the empirical results showed that the bias was pronounced
only for high-valued options. By contrast, the former expla-
nation accords with the intuition that participants pay more
attention (to stimuli, to outcomes) on trials in which they have
to earn rewards by making correct choices, as compared to
trials in which all they do is follow instructions. Therefore, it
is not necessarily prediction errors that are enhanced in
rewarded, free-choice trials. It could also be activity in striatal
neurons or their cortical afferents.
In addition to the behavioral and modeling results, Cock-
burn et al. also genotyped their participants, focusing on
three dopamine-related genes [9]. They found a significant
interaction between the pattern of preferences for freely
chosen options and DARPP-32 genotype: participants with
one variant of this gene preferred the most highly rewarding
(80%) freely chosen options most strongly, with the prefer-
ence diminishing as reward probability decreased. By con-
trast, those without this genotype showed strongest
preference for the freely chosen option that was associated
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preference diminishing as reward probability increased.
Model simulations showed that this interaction could be
the result of a different balance between learning in the ‘go’
as compared to the ‘no-go’ pathway in the two populations.
These results, therefore, tie preferences for freely chosen
options to learning in the basal ganglia. However, given that
the genetic variation was likely not due to group differences
in the free-choice enhancement of learning, the genetic
results could not further illuminate the precise implemen-
tation of the free-choice bias.
Whether the free-choice learning bias results from do-
paminergic or other mechanisms remains to be resolved. In
the meantime, next time you want a child (or a student) to
be happy with their toy (or project), try to set things up so
that they can choose it ‘freely,’ even if in reality there is
only one viable option. We’ve seen it done, and it works.
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